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SÁNDOR LÁSZLÓ TÓTH 
This study analyzes the plans of the Ottoman Porte in the so-called "Fifteen 
Years' War" or "Long War" (1593-1606) waged in Hungary against the Habsburg 
Empire. Besides determining territories or targets (fortresses) of Ottoman expan-
sion I intend to focus on a special problem, whether the Porte aimed at direct ex-
pansion, i.e. the gradual annexation of the whole of Hungary1 or considering the 
huge distance from Istanbul it was content with just an indirect expansion, i.e. the 
creation of vassal provinces2 as both forms of expansion were apparent in this 
war.3 
For a better understanding of the Ottoman aims the antecedents and causes of . 
the Fifteen Years' War should be outlined. As a result of the Hungarian cam-
paigns of Siileyman the middle parts of the Hungarian Kingdom fell under direct 
Ottoman rule (the vilayets of Buda and Temesvár). The eastern part of Hungary, 
1 For Ottoman methods of conquest consisting of 2 phases (vassal state, annexation) cf. 
H. ínalcik, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest" Studia Islamica (1954), 104-129; 4 phases 
(raids, decisive battle, vassal state, annexation) were supposed in the case of Hungary, 
cf. Gy. Rázsó, "Zsigmond-kori Magyarország és a török veszély" [Hungary in the Age 
of Sigismund and the Turkish Menace] Hadtörténelmi Közlemények XX (1973), 410; 
F. Szakály, Vesztőhely az út porában. [Scaffold in the Dust of the Road] Budapest 1986, 
114-115. 
2 It was supposed, that Siileyman wanted Hungary to be a "buffer" or "vassal state" 
against the Habsburgs (the "offer of Siileyman"), cf. G. Perjés, Mohács. Budapest 1979, 
80-81,124. 
3 Both methods were used, cf. Á. Várkonyi, Három évszázad Magyarország történetében, 
1526-1790. I. A megosztottság évszázada 1526-1606. [Three Centuries of Hungarian His-
tory 1526-1790. I. The Age of Division 1526-1606.] Budapest 1999, 180-181; S. L. Tóth, 
A mezőkeresztesi csata és a tizenöt éves háború. [The Battle of Mezőkeresztes and the Fif-
teen Years' War] Szeged 2000,129-134. 
7 9 
SÁNDOR LÁSZLÓ TÓTH 
Transylvania belonged to the Ottoman Empire as well, as a tribute-paying vassal 
state. The northern (Highlands) and western (west parts of Transdanubia) por-
tions of the late Hungarian Kingdom remained under the rule of the Habsburg 
kings, although they paid tribute to the Porte from 1547. This division of Hun-
gary between two confronting empires and the existence of fort-systems along 
the frequently changing borderlines resulted in unstable conditions. Even during 
the long period of peace in Hungary (1568-1593) after the death of Siileyman 
(1566) and the treaty of Edirne (1568) there were frequent raids from both sides. 
Both the Porte and the Habsburg court blamed each other for breaking the truce. 
Till the close of its long war with Persia (1578-1590) the Porte avoided a clash 
with its western opponent, the Habsburg Empire, although there were constant 
raids resulting sometimes in greater border conflicts.4 
The tension increased after 1590, particularly along the Bosnian-Croatian bor-
ders, due to the activity of the new beglerbeg of Bosnia. Hasan Pasha raided the 
Sclavonian and Croatian territories, occupied fortresses (e.g. Bihac) and fought 
battles with local troops (1591-1593).5 With these raids Hasan violated the truce 
and the Habsburg government asked for capital punishment or dismissal for the 
Bosnian governor and demanded the return of the occupied fortresses.6 Since 
Hasan had patrons in Istanbul, he just received warning letters but preserved his 
post.7 Emperor Rudolf's (1576-1612) reaction was to not send the yearly "honor-
ary present" (Verehrung) or tribute of 30,000 ducats. So both sides violated the 
truce of Edirne recently renewed in Istanbul in November 1590. The crisis in-
creased, when Koca Sinan became Grand Vizier again in January 1593. Sinan 
wrote a menacing letter to Emperor Rudolf in 7 February 1593, in which he de-
manded two years' tribute and the release of two captive begs taken prisoner in 
1588.8 The Grand Vizier tried to intimidate ambassador Friedrich Kreckwitz by 
threatening him and isolating the building of the Habsburg embassy. At the same 
4 For this "Kleinkrieg" cf. V. J. Parry, "The successors of Sulaiman." in M. A. Cook, ed., 
A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730. Cambridge 1976,116; C. Finkel, The Administra-
tion of Warfare. The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606. Wien 1988, 8; 
G. Bayerle, Ottoman Diplomacy in Hungary. Letters from the Pashas of Buda (1590-1593). 
Bloomington 1972,10-12. 
5 For Hasan's raids cf., Parry, The successors of Suleiman, 116; C. M. Kortepeter, Ottoman 
Imperialism during the Reformation Europe and the Caucasus. New York 1972, 132-133; 
M. Jacov, I Balcani tra impero ottomano e potenze europee (sec. XVI e XVII) il ruolo della 
diplomazia pontificia. Cosenza 1997,13-15; Tóth, A mezőkeresztesi csata, 75-78. 
6 For the protest of the Habsburg court in 1591 cf., Bayerle, Ottoman Diplomacy, 113-114; 
in 1592 cf., Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Wien), Turcica, Karton (henceforth: HHStA Tur-
cica, K) 78. fol. 5r-6r (letter of Emperor Rudolf to Grand Vizier Siyavus, 1 May 1592) 
"ille Bassa revocetur ac deponatur" etc.; in 1593 cf., HHStA Turcica I. K 80. fol. 32™ 
"Bosnensis Basa aliisque violatae pacis auctores puniantur sitoque loco ac magistratu 
amoveantur" (Emperor Rudolf to the Sultan, 8 February 1593) 
7 Cf. Finkel, The Administration, 10-11. 
8 Sinan's letter was published in Hungarian by G. Gömöry, in Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 
8 (1894), 393-394; for its analysis cf., Tóth, A mezőkeresztesi csata, 68-69. 
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time orders of mobilization were sent to the beglerbegs of Rumili and Temesvár.9 
The Habsburg court promised to send the tribute by July, but it demanded the 
return of the forts occupied by Hasan and the exchange of the captive begs for 
Christian prisoners.10 The crisis reached its peak, when the obstinate Hasan 
raided the Sclavonian borders again in June 1593, but during the siege of Sisek he 
was defeated by a smaller Christian relief army in 22 June.11 When the news of 
the defeat reached the Porte, a council (divan) was summoned by Sultan Murad 
III on 4 July. Grand Vizier Sinan proposed war, because the "infidels" endan-
gered the "well-protected domain of Islam" and promised victory. The leader of 
the rival faction, Ferhad emphasized the lateness and difficulties of a campaign, 
while Sejkh-ül-Islam Zekeriyye opposed the war for moral reasons.12 The harem 
and the soldiers supported the war, so Sinan was appointed commander-in-chief 
(serdar) by the Sultan. The motives or causes of declaring war against the Habs-
burg Empire may be summarized thus:13 
1. General tension, raids and refusal to pay taxes by the peasants to the Sipa-
his14 along the borders, which resulted from the divided possession of Hungary 
(condominium) and the crisis on the Sclavonian-Croatian borders culminating in 
the Ottoman defeat at Sisek. 
2. The deliberate delay of the tribute, which was interpreted by the Porte as an 
open violation of the truce. 
3. The danger of an anti-Ottoman alliance urged by Pope Clement VIII and the 
Habsburg policy directing towards getting Poland and the Ottoman vassal, Tran-
sylvania. 
9 For Kreckwitz and his relation with Sinan, see A. H. Loebl, "Der slesier Friedrich von 
Kreckwitz als Kaiserlicher Gesandter bei der hohen Pforte." Vereins fiir die Geschichte 
Schlesiens 18 (1914), 160-173; Tóth, A mezőkeresztesi csata, 68-70, 82-83; for the orders to 
the beglerbegs cf. Finkel, The Administration, 11. 
10 Cf., e.g. the letter of Emperor Rudolf to Grand Vizier Sinan (24 May 1593) HHStA Tur-
cica I. K 80. fol. 153r*v 
11 For the battle of Sisek see the report of Eggenberg on 22 June, HHStA Hungarica, Allge-
meine Akten (henceforth: HHStA Hungarica) Fasc. 124. No. 9. fol. 179r-180r; the report 
of Eggenberg on 24 June, HHStA Hungarica Fasc. 124. No. 10. fol. 184r-186v; the latter 
was published by A. Hugyecz, Hadtörténelmi Közlemények (1894), 264-266; for an analy-
sis of the battle cf. G. Gömöry, "A sziszeki csata 1593-ban." [The Battle of Sisek in 1593] 
Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 8 (1894), 613-634; P. Tomac, "La Battaile de Sisak (22 Juin 
1593)." Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire (1981), 279-282. 
12 For the divan, cf., the historical works of Pe$evi and Katip £elebi, their Hungarian 
translation, Török történetírók III. (156-1659) [Turkish Historians III. 1566-1659]. tr., 
I. Karácson, Budapest 1916, (henceforth: TT III.) 94-95. (Pe?evi), 203-204. (Katip gelebi); 
cf., the report of Kreckwitz (4 July 1593), HHStA Turcica K 81. fol. 7-10. 
13 For the causes of the war in general cf. Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperialism, 216-217; 
S. L. Tóth, "Szinán nagyvezér tervei 1593-94-ben." [The Plans of Grand Vizier Sinan in 
1593-94]. Hadtörténelmi Közlemények New Series 29 (1982), 159-165. 
14 For the importance of the denial of the taxes to Sipahis, cf., Bayerle, Ottoman Diplomacy, 
1 1 - 1 2 . 
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4. The dominant faction led by the ambitious Sinan yearning for military glory 
demanded war to revenge the defeat of Sisek and the delay in paying the tribute. 
These causes may explain the goals followed by the Porte and its main repre-
sentative, Sinan Pasha in this war. Sinan wanted to achieve these aims partly by 
campaigns and partly by policy using military pressure or menace as well. The 
Grand Vizier may have realised, that his ambitious plans needed more time, than 
just the late campaign of 1593, but he would probably have liked to finish a suc-
cessful war by 1595, i.e. within three years and to avoid a long war.15 Since the 
main cause of the war may be considered the Hungarian "condominium", Sinan 
wanted to end this. The Grand Vizier told the English envoy, Edward Barton in 
July while preparing for the campaign of 1593, that "if the Emperor chose to sur-
render all his possessions in Hungary it would then be possible to treat of peace, 
and to allow him to enjoy the rest in quiet; but if he were to offer thirty tributes 
he would find a deaf ear turned to his proposals."16 Sinan's words show, that the 
Porte preferred the possession of Royal or Habsburg Hungary to payment of the 
tribute by the Habsburgs. According to a report on a military council held by Si-
nan at Eszék in September 1593, it was decided, that they would take over the 
whole territory and bring the Hungarian kingdom under the rule of the sultan.17 
Later, in February 1594 Miklós Pálffy referred in his letter to the Turkish demand, 
that Emperor Rudolf should remove his hand from the Hungarians, i.e. to give 
up Hungary.18 Even in the Ottoman peace conditions of February 1595 conveyed 
by Sinanpasazáde Mehmed the main point was, that thé Emperor should leave 
Hungary to the Ottomans.19 On the basis of these sources one may say, that the 
"minimal program" of Sinan was the conquest of Royal or Habsburg Hungary.20 
At the same time Sinan did not seem to be satisfied with just the possession of 
Hungary. As early as July 1593 he stated while conversing with the English am-
15 Sir Paul Rycaut observed in the 17th century, that the Ottomans had an old tradition of 
waging war for no longer than three years, see L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453. 
New York 1961,121; for its application to the Fifteen Years' War cf. Tóth, Szinán nagy-
vezér, 171-172. 
16 H. F. Brown, ed. Calendar of state papers and manuscripts relating to English affairs, existing 
in the archives and collections of Venice, and in other libraries of Northern Italy, vol. IX. 1592-
1603. London 1897, (henceforth: CSP IX.) 84. (Mattheo Zane, Venetian Ambassador in 
Constantinople to the Doge and Senate on 24 July 1593.) 
17 The report from 13 September 1593. cf. HHStA Hungarica Fasc. 124. fol. 90r"v: "univer-
sam hanc provinciám [...] deleant, Regum Ungariae in potestatem Imperatoris eorum 
convertant." 
18 For Pálffy's letter see P. Jedlicska, Adatok Erdődy báró Pálffy Miklós a győri hősnek életrajza 
és korához 1552-1600. [Data to the Life and Age of Nicholas Pálffy, the hero of Győri 
Eger 1897,498-501. (No. 852/a) 
19 The Ottoman conditions of peace were published by M. Ivanics, "Friedensangebot oder 
kriegerische erpressung? (Briefwechsel des Kaisers Rudolfs II. mit dem Pascha von 
Ofen im Jahre 1595)." Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 82 (1992), 183-
199. 
20 Cf., Tóth, Szinán nagyvezér, 167-168; Tóth, A mezőkeresztesi csata, 130-131. 
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bassador, that "this war would not end in Hungary but would spread to Vienna, 
and he himself would not be satisfied till he had levelled the walls of Rome."21 At 
the council (divan) held on 4 July the Grand Vizier promised the capture of Em-
peror Rudolf, which could be realized just by conquering the new Habsburg 
capital, Prague.22 Sinan himself emphasized in a letter in August 1593, that he 
was marching against the German king and his country.23 The Grand Vizier men-
tioned to the Transylvanian envoy in September 1593, that next spring he would 
attack Vienna and Prague.24 Even Emperor Rudolf knew that Sinan wanted to oc-
cupy not only the remaining parts of the Hungarian and Austrian borders, but to 
attack the capital of Austria, the "door" of Germany, i. e. Vienna.25 We have infor-
mation, that after the capture of Gyor (Raab) in 1594, Sinan planned to attack Vi-
enna next year, 1595.26 The occupation of the centres of the Habsburg Empire, 
namely Vienna and Prague may be regarded as the "maximal program" of Si-
nan.27 Considering the distance of these cities from Istanbul these plans seems to 
be unrealistic. At the same time it is evident from the sources, that the Ottomans 
had certain important goals as they conquered new territories. The important 
targets of their expansion were sometimes called "red apples" (kizil elma), i. e. 
"golden apples". First Constantinople (before 1453), then Buda (before 1541) and 
later Vienna, Prague and Rome were considered "golden apples" by the Otto-
mans.28 At the time of the Fifteen Years' War the former capital, Vienna was the 
seat of a Habsburg archduke (Ernest and from 1594 Matthias) directing the mili-
tary affairs of Hungary as a substitute for the Emperor. The capital of the Czech 
Kingdom, Prague became the centre of the Habsburg Empire in 1578, when Em-
peror Rudolf moved his court there. While the invasion of the two centres of the 
Habsburg Empire can be considered an evident, although an overambitious plan, 
21 CSP IX, 84. (24 July 1593.) 
22 t t HI, 194-195. (Pegevi) 
23 For Sinan's letter of 9 August 1593 to Ferenc Nádasdy cf., Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár 
[National Széchenyi Library] (Hungary, Budapest) Litterae Turcicae, Fol. Hung. 934. 
21 r-22 r . 
24 Baranyai Decsi János magyar históriája 1592-1598. [The Hungarian history of János Bara-
nyai Decsi] tr., P. Kulcsár, Budapest 1982, (henceforth: Baranyai Decsi) 101. 
25 For the letter of Rudolf to Philip II on 10 June 1594. see in: M. Hatvani, Magyar törté-
nelmi okmánytár a brüsseli országos levéltárból és a burgundi könyvtárból. [Hungarian His-
torical Documents Collected from the National Archive of Brussel and from the Li-
brary of Burgund] III. (1553-1608). Pest 1859, (henceforth: Hatvani 1859.) 54-58."Seinen 
Intent und Anschlag nach die Haupt Statt unsers Erzherzogthumbs Österreich Wien 
(welchen der Sinan Bassa zwar nit unpillicher das Thor zum Teutschlandt nennt) 
übergwaltigen und seine Macht bekhomen möcht." 
26 Cf., M. Istvánffy, Magyarország története 1490-1606. [The History of Hungary 1490-
1606]. tr., Gy. Vidovich, Debrecen 1868, 722; C. Woodhead, Talikizade's sehname-i hiima-
yun. A History of the Ottoman Campaign into Hungary 1593-1594. Berlin 1983, 360-361, 
364. 
27 Cf., Tóth, Szinán nagyvezér, 167-168.; Tóth, A mezőkeresztesi csata, 130-131. 
28 For an analysis of "kizil elma" concept see P. Fodor, Magyarország és a török hódítás. 
[Hungary and the Ottoman Conquest] Budapest 1991,121-159. 
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the attack on Rome seems quite absurd. Besides Sinan's statement to Barton, a re-
port from the Porte also testifies, that the Grand Vizier's intention was to reach 
Rome with his campaign.29 Rome was the symbolic centre of Christendom (res 
publico. Christiana), the seat of Pope Clement VIII, who tried to organize a new 
crusade against the Ottomans. These factors explain the fantastic plan of Sinan. 
So it seems very probable, that both the total conquest of Hungary and the occu-
pation of Vienna and Prague (and perhaps Rome) were planned by Grand Vizier 
Sinan. 
Besides these general, rather unrealistic goals the Ottoman leadership had 
more realistic plans, which were related to the aforementioned general aims. At 
the beginning of each Ottoman campaign the Porte fixed the goals, i.e. the occu-
pation of certain fortresses. Later, during the campaign the leader (serdar) of the 
campaign held a council, which approved of or modified the goal(s) of the cam-
paign.30 In case of the first campaign of the Fifteen Years' War, in 1593 Sinan Pa-
sha was warned at the council of 4 July, that it was too late for a campaign.31 He 
was ordered by Sultan Murad III to make winter quarters in Belgrade in order to 
start the new campaign earlier the next year.32 It seems, that the concrete plan of 
the 1593 campaign was formed at the council (divan) held by Sinan on the borders 
of Ottoman Hungary, at Eszék. Formerly the Ottomans thought of three attacking 
armies: one led by Sinan against Eger (Erlau) in the north, another led by the Pa-
sha of Buda (Ofen) against three smaller forts in the west (Veszprém, Palota and 
Tata), and a third led by the Pasha of Temesvár with the help of the vassal prince 
of Transylvania in the southwest.33 The attack on Eger was postponed and Sinan 
decided to attack the three fortresses in the west (Transdanubian region) with the 
cooperation of the beglerbegs of Rumeli and Buda.34 Two of these forts (Vesz-
prém and Palota) were occupied in October 1593, but Sinan was forced to re-
nounce the siege of the third fortress, Tata. 
Next year, in 1594 the Porte at first again planned a divided action against 
Eger in the north and Győr in the west.35 In the end the attack against Eger was 
29 See the letter of Gergely diák to Péter Huszár, Hadtörténelmi Intézet Levéltára [The Ar-
chive of the Military Institute] (Hungary, Budapest) Törökkori Iratok Gyűjteménye [The 
Collection of Documents from the Ottoman Period] 1593/13. 
30 Cf. S. L. Tóth, "Török stratégia a tizenöt éves háborúban." [Ottoman Strategy in the Fif-
teen Years'War] Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila József nominatae. Acta Histórica 
69 (1981), 38-39. 
31 Cf., Kätip gelebi, in: TT III, 204. 
32 Kätip gelebi, in: TT III, 203. 
33 See footnote 17. (the report of 13 September 1593) 
34 E.g. HHStA Hungarica Fasc. 125. fol. 2'-3v (a report to Emperor Rudolf in September 
1593) "Ir Intent vor andern ietzt auf Wesprim, Pallotha und Tottis gericht sei"; fol. 8r-9r 
(report of 29 September) "Tottis, Pallatta, und Wesprim belagern und einnahmen 
woltten". 
35 A. Veress, Documente privitoare la istoria Ardealului, Moldovei si Tarii-Romänesti. [Docu-
ments on the History of Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia] vol. IV. (1593-1595). 
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not carried out and Sinan's later plans included just Tata and Győr (Yanik).36 In 
addition to the occupation of these forts the Grand Vizier invaded Szentmárton, 
Pápa and unsuccessfully attacked the fortress of Komárom. Since the occupation 
of Vienna and Prague was the general aim of the Porte, it is understandable, that 
most of the Ottoman campaigns of the war were directed against the fortresses of 
western Transdanubia: 10 out of 13 in fact.37 As mentioned above, Sinan wanted 
to attack Vienna in 1595, but because of the death of Sultan Murad III and the ac-
cession of Mehmed III and the revolt of the vassal states (Transylvania, Walla-
chia, Moldavia) this plan was postponed and the Ottomans merely tried to de-
fend their Hungarian territories in 1595, while their main forces attacked in Wal-
lachia.38 Because of the defeats on both fronts (fall of Esztergom, defeat at Gyur-
gyevo), the next campaign in 1596 was led Sultan Mehmed III himself. It seems, 
that Grand Vizier Sinan planned the attack on Vienna again, but he died in April 
1596, and his successor, Ibrahim led the army against Eger (Erlau), which was 
conquered (October 1596) and retained due to the Ottoman victory in the largest 
battle of the war at Mezőkeresztes (22-26 October 1596).39 In the remaining, ten 
years of the war - apart from the Habsburg reconquest of Győr (1598) and the 
Ottoman occupation of Kanizsa (1600) and recapture of Esztergom (1605) - the 
situation did not change much. At the end of the war Grand Vizier Lala Mehmed 
planned again to march against Vienna in alliance with the leader of the Hun-
garian revolt against the Habsburgs, István Bocskai, but this was refused by Sul-
tan Ahmed I and Bocskai alike.40 So in practice Sinan's ambitious plans were not 
realized: the Ottomans were not able to conquer even Royal or Habsburg Hun-
gary (just the fortresses of Eger and Kanizsa) let alone of Vienna and Prague. 
The last question is, whether the Porte planned to annex Royal Hungary or to 
establish vassal state(s). It cannot be decided which option Sinan preferred, be-
cause both forms of conquest were suitable for him. This alternative was reflected 
in his policy. Hungary was offered in 1594 and 1595 to Sigismund Báthory, the 
Bucuresti 1932, (henceforth: Veress 1932,) 51. (No. 33. - the report of Mihály Szegődi to 
Farkas Kovacsóczy, 6 February 1594) 
36 The council held at Cankurtaran decided to attack Tata, then Győr, cf. TT III, 221. 
(Kátip £elebi); besides Tata and Győr the fort of Komárom was also mentioned by Ab-
dul-kadir Efendi, cf., M. Ivanics, A Krími Kánság a tizenöt éves háborúban. [The Khanate 
of Krim in the Fifteen Years' War] Budapest 1994, 65. 
37 S. L. Tóth, "A törők haditevékenység akciórádiusza a 15 éves háborúban." [The Actio 
Radius of the Ottoman Military Activity in the Fifteen Years' War] Hadtörténelmi 
Közlemények 32 (1985), 773. 
38 For the campaign of 1595 cf., J. Hammer, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches. Band 4. 
Graz 1963, 248-254; Parry, The successors ofSulaiman, 118-119; S. Shaw, History of the Ot-
toman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. I.: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ot-
toman Empire, 1280-1808. Cambridge 1976, 184-185; Tóth, A mezőkeresztesi csata, 165-
185. 
39 For the campaign of 1596 and the battle of Mezőkeresztes cf., Tóth, A mezőkeresztesi 
csata, 186-262. 
40 See TT III, 189. (Pe?evi); Hammer, Geschichte, 384-385. 
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vassal prince of Transylvania possibly in order to keep him the vassal of the sul-
tan.41 However, the vassal status was reserved for those territories, which the 
Grand Vizier did not want to attack. These territories were north of the main 
routes of the Ottoman attack towards Vienna and included the Hungarian High-
lands (north of the Danube) and the Czech (Bohemian) Kingdom. Sinan renewed 
the policy of Sultan Süleyman, at the beginning of the war (summer and autumn 
of 1593) some territories were offered to certain Hungarian lords, if they accepted 
the overlordship of the Sultan and paid tribute. One of these planned vassal 
states was the principality (voivodate) of Kassa named after the most important city 
of the region, the centre of a military district, the Highland border (oberun-
garische Grenze).42 It would have included the eastern parts of the Hungarian 
Highlands, northeast of the river Danube. The other planned vassal state was the 
Czech Kingdom. These territories with vassal status were offered to at least three 
Hungarian lords: Ferenc Nádasdy, István Báthory (of Ecsed) and Ferenc Dobó.43 
It seems, that it did not matter for the Ottomans, which of these lords accepted 
the offer and which of them ruled one or the other vassal state.44 From the Otto-
man point-of-view the important point was, if the Hungarians accepted the "offer 
of Sinan" it would have been possible to concentrate the military efforts solely on 
the transdanubian front and perhaps to march against Vienna. 
In my opinion Sinan wanted to annex the western transdanubian parts of 
Royal Hungary, where he established three new provinces (vilayets) in 1594, 
namely Győr (Yanik), Pápa (Papa) and Szigetvár (Sigetvar)45 With these new 
41 According to a Venetian report of 25 October 1594 Grand Vizier Sinan offered Prince 
Sigismund of Báthory, to make him the king of Hungary, cf., E. Hurmuzaki, Docwnente 
privitóre la Istoria Románilor. vol. III/2. (1576-1600). [Documents on the History of the 
Rumanians] Bucuresci 1888, 55; a contemporary Transylvanian historian, István 
Szamosközy mentioned, that in 1595 the Sultan offered Hungary to Sigismund Báthory 
and to enthrone him in Buda, cf., Szamosközy István történeti maradványai. [The Histori-
cal Heritage of István Szamosközy] 1542-1608. vol. IV. ed., S. Szilágyi, Budapest 1880, 
51. 
42 Kassa is today Kosice in Slovakia; for the system of military and provincial districts cf., 
G. Pálffy, "A török elleni védelem szervezetének története a kezdetektől a 18. század 
elejéig." [The History of the System of Defense against the Turks from the Beginnings 
to the 18th Century] Történelmi Szemle (1996/2-3), 163-214. 
43 In the letter of Hasan Pasha (beglerbeg of Temesvár) to István Báthori (4 September 
1593) the voivodate of Kassa was offered, for the Latin and German version cf., HHStA 
Hnngarica Fasc. 124. fol. 52r-54r; it was published in Hungarian, see Veress 1932, 104-
106.; the voivodate of Kassa was offered to Ferenc Dobó, and the Bohemian kingdom 
to István Báthori in the letter of Hasan Pasha to Ferenc Dobó (4 September 1593), for 
the Latin and German version cf., HHStA Hungarica Fasc. 124. fol. 56r-58r; the Bohe-
mian Kingdom was offered to Ferenc Nádasdy by Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha in his let-
ter of 9 August 1593, see Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár (Budapest) Litterae Turcica, Fol. 
Hung. 934. 21r-22r 
44 Tóth, A mezőkeresztesi csata, 132-134. 
45 For the establishment of these vilayets in 1594, cf., G. Dávid, Török közigazgatás Magyar-
országon. Akadémiai doktori értekezés [Ottoman Administration in Hungary. Aca-
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provinces the Grand Vizier probably wanted to lay the basis for the conquest of 
Vienna the following year. At the same time, north of this new conquest he 
would have preferred two vassal states under the guidance of Hungarian lords 
(voivodate of Kassa, kingdom of Bohemia). The Ottoman concept of conquest ac-
cepted both direct annexation and the establishment of vassal states: the territo-
ries of both types were called vilayets. It was legalized by Muslim theory, since 
according to the accepted Hanafite theory the dar iil-ahd (territory of treaty), i. e. 
the vassal state formed part of the dar iil-Islam (territory of Islam), i.e. the Otto-
man Empire.46 Consequently the plans of expansion would seem to have been the 
conquest of whole of Royal Hungary and perhaps the Habsburg Empire (repre-
sented by Vienna and Prague) either by way of military force (occupation of for-
tresses in Transdanubia and Austria and converting them into Ottoman prov-
inces) or by the Habsburg emperor's renunciation of his territories and/or by the 
voluntary cooperation of some Hungarian lords accepting Ottoman suzerainty 
(vassal states in the northeastern region of the Habsburg Empire). These goals 
existed simultaneously and the Porte tried to accomodate itself to the always 
changing realities and military circumstances of the Fifteen Years' War. 
demie dissertation] Budapest 1995, 153-155, 156, 280-282, 381, 400-404; S. L. Tóth: 
"Vilajetek a hódoltságban." [Viláyets in Ottoman Hungary] Acta Universitatis Szegedi-
ensis de Attila József nominatae. Acta Histórica 109 (1999), 67-70. 
46 For these categories of Ottoman (Sunnite) law, cf. M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the 
Law of Islam. Baltimore 1955, 52-53, 64, 141, 143-145, 155-156; Tóth, Szinán nagyvezér, 
159-160. 
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